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able in the principal case, since the child was over the age limit
prescribed by the adoption sections. The import of the case, then,
consists in providing an alternative solution to those in petitioner's
position, who would otherwise be unable to gain admission for their
children under nonquota status.
It is not likely that the decision will "offer attractive possibilities
for fraud," as the government contended. The holding here was
limited to situations of pre-existing family units formed outside the
United States. Therefore, its use as a precedent for the general
importation of illegitimate children would be precluded. 19
In view of the congressional expression of a policy favoring an
easing of immigration restrictions 20 with reference to separated
families, the instant decision is long overdue. This case is representative of the humanitarian approach being applied to the problem
of immigrant family unity. The 1965 amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act prescribes a new "series of preference
categories that give priority to minor children . . . of persons
who have become citizens .
. under the old law." 21
Significantly, the statute does not affect Section 101(b) (1) (B)
or (D) .22 Since it is to be assumed that Congress was aware
of the instant case, its silence in this matter would seem to
indicate agreement with the Court's interpretation.
The Court, by its decision, has taken the most reasonable
avenue available, striking down an arbitrary barrier established by
a literal statutory interpretation which was clearly inconsistent with
the basic policy underlying the law's enactment.

LABOR LAWBARGAINING ORDER INAPPROPRIATE TO REMEDY
BORDERLINE EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRAcTIcE. - On the day of
a scheduled election to determine whether twenty-eight employees of
respondent, a New York corporation, desired unionization, the employer distributed a letter to the employees which contained promises
of future benefits, in addition to an invitation to deal directly with
the respondent. Subsequent to losing the election, the union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a "bargaining order"
which was issued by the Board upon a finding that the employer's
letter constituted an unfair labor practice. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision of

and spouse. . . ." (Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b) (1) (F), 75

Stat. 650 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1)(F) (1964)).
'9
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Supra note 15, at 538-39.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1952).

N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.

Pub. L. No. 236, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 3, 1965).
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the Board, holding that a "bargaining order" is not an appropriate
remedy where the facts indicate merely a borderline, unaggravated
violation of the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB v. Flonutic
Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
A union whose request for recognition has been refused may
pursue two courses of action under the National Labor Relations
Act (hereinafter referred to as NLRA). First, it may file a refusal to bargain charge,' the success of which is dependent upon a
showing that the union represented a majority of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit ;2 that the employer refused to
bargain ;3 and that the refusal was in bad faith.4 In the alternative,
the union may file a petition for a representation election alleging
that a question of representation exists.5
Section 10(c) of the NLRA empowers the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) to order a
party who is guilty of an unfair labor practice "to take such affirmative action.., as will effectuate the policies of the... [NLRA]." 6
Although the Board, as an administrative organ, is given broad
discretion, it is not entirely insulated from judicial review. While
the Board is to determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices will be expunged 7 a court will not enforce a Board order
when it is oppressive or not calculated to effectuate the policies of
the NLRA.8 Moreover, when enforcement becomes necessary, reI The refusal to bargain charge will be filed pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act §8(a)(5), which states: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C.
2 § 158(a) (5) (1964).
1t is a question for the Board as to what constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit so as to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 49 Stat. 453
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964); CoHN, LABoR LAw 150-51

(1964).

s An employer refuses to bargain if he is motivated by "a rejection of
the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which
to undermine the union." Artcraft Hosiery Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 333, 334

(1948).

4Bad faith can be determined only after the Board examines all the
circumstances surrounding the refusal to bargain. The circumstances should
include the "unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events,
and the 'time lapse between the refusal and the unlawful conduct." Joy
Silk Mills, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949), modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). It should also be noted that an
employer does not have any obligation to bargain until a "clear and unequivocal" request to do so has been made by the majority representative.
5A charge of unlawful refusal to bargain under § 8(a)(5) must allege
that there is no question of representation, and that the union is the exclusive representative. A representation petition requires the Board to find
that a question of representation exists, and that it remains to be resolved
by an election. See Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
649 Stat 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
7
lnternational Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
s Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
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sort must be had to the courts, since the Board's orders are not
self-enforcing.9
In M. H. Davidson Co.,10 the employer refused to bargain in
violation of Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the NLRA.11 The
union, believing a genuine question of representation existed, petitioned the Board for a representation election-which was subsequently lost. The Board, having been petitioned by the union to
review the election, found that the employer, by interrogating his
employees, making threats of reprisals, promising various benefits,
and discharging two employees, had engaged in unfair labor practices. The employer contended that the union had waived any
objections it might have had concerning its conduct prior to the
election since, having knowledge of the unfair labor practices, it had
proceeded with the election. However, the Board dismissed this
contention indicating that the waiver principle should be applied
only in those cases where a bona fide question concerning representation exists.' 2 The court held that the employer's actions demonstrated "the bad faith of its original challenge of the union's
majority.""13 Therefore, no genuine question of representation
existed, and an application of the waiver doctrine would constitute
a complete disregard of the Board's obligation to enforce the public
policy against those refusals to bargain which induced the filing of
the petition. "In such a situation the Board's statutory obligation
to prevent refusals to bargain and to enforce the public policy
enunciated by the Act is paramount." 14
In 1954, the Board expressly overruled Davidson in Aiello
Dairy Farms,'5 and propounded a doctrine which estopped a union
from asserting an employer's unfair labor practices '8 where the
union proceeded to a representation election with knowledge of
those practices. The Board indicated that once the union had ascertained the employer's unfair labor practices it had two courses
to pursue: (1) it could file a charge of unfair labor practices against
9 CoEmN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 151. Section 7 enumerates the employee's right to organize and bargain collectively. 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Section 9(c) (1-) provides for Boardconducted representation elections by secret ballot where the employees'
rights under section 7 have been infringed. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
10 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951).
11 Section 8(a) (1) states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. . . ." 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
For provisions of section
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
8(a) (5), see supra note 1.
12Denton Sleeping Garment Mills, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 329 (1951).
23 M. H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142, 144 (1951).
14 Id. at 144-45.
25
110 N.L.LrB.
(1954). Act § 8 (a) (5), supra note 1.
Labor1365
Relations
Is National
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the employer prior to the election; or (2) it could proceed with
the representation election. Had the union filed its charge of
refusal to bargain before conducting the representation election, the
Board would not have ordered the election until it determined the
validity of the charges.17 Thus, the Board held that the union must
choose between the available remedies since they are mutually inconsistent. The majority indicated that it would be a duplication
of effort for the Board to process a refusal to bargain charge after
the union had failed to establish a majority in the election, irrespective of the employer's bad faith in refusing to bargain. Under the
Davidson rule, a union could cause such duplication by not filing an
unfair labor charge until after having lost the election.'
It must
be remembered, however, that the rule in Aiello was not applicable
in cases where the union was not cognizant of the unfair labor practices until after the election. 9
Recently, the Board overruled Aiello in Bernel Foam Prods.
Co., 20 and reinstated the Davidson rationale, holding that the diverse
remedies available to a union are not mutually inconsistent because:
Although in filing a representation petition the union asserts as a formal
matter that a question concerning representation exists, as a practical
matter, the union has not altered its position that it represents the employees and it is entitled to recognition. Rather it is stating the employer's assertion of such a question and seeking an election as a means
of proving that there is no validity in that assertion. 21
The Board indicated that a representation election does not
determine whether or not the union had a majority at the time of
the refusal to bargain, but only whether the union had a majority
on the date of the election. The choice referred to in Aiello was
created not by the union but by the employer's unlawful conduct.
Therefore,
there is no warrant for imposing upon the union . . . an irrevocable
option as to the method it will pursue in seeking vindication of the
17 If the Board found that unfair labor practices existed and that the
union was the representative of the employees, it would have issued a
bargaining order. If the Board, on the other hand, found that unfair

labor practices had been committed, but that a genuine question of whether

the union was the representative of the employees existed, it would have
ordered a representation election. See Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B.
1365 (1954).
is See M. H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142 (1951).
19 See, e.g., Southwester Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 805, 806-07 (1955); Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 708, 709-10, enforced, 228 F.2d
159 (5th Cir. 1955); Alexander Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1457, 1460-61
(1954).
20 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
21 Id. at 1280.
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employees' representation rights while permitting2 2the offending party to
enjoy . . . the fruits of such unlawful conduct.
For conduct that has been specifically proscribed by Congress, an
adequate remedy should exist: Bernel makes a choice of two easily
accessible remedies available to a union afflicted by an employer's
unfair practice.
In the instant case, the Court was presented with two questions which arose as a result of the union's allegation, subsequent
to the representation election, that the defendant Flomatic Corp.
had engaged in unfair labor practices.
Initially it was necessary
to ascertain whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding that the employer had violated section 8(a) (1).
Secondly, the Court had to determine whether the bargaining order
issued by the Board was an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. The Court decided that there was substantial evidence to
support the section 8(a) (1) charge, although there was not a
section 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain violation. Then, in discussing
the propriety of a bargaining order, the Court pointed out that
while such an order may effectively remedy an employer's interference with an election, possible adverse effects on employees' rights
must also be considered.
Since a bargaining order dispenses with the necessity of a prior secret
election, there is a possibility that the imposition of such an order may
unnecessarily undermine the freedom of choice that Congress wanted to
guarantee to the employees,
and thus frustrate rather than effectuate
23
the policies of the Act.
While the employer's letter did constitute an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a) (1) since it contained promises of benefits, nevertheless, the Court found no flagrant violation of the section 24 and
therefore25 considered the bargaining order an unnecessarily harsh
remedy.
22 Ibid.

NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
No coercive measures were resorted to by the employer; he did
not discharge any employees. Compare Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB,
52 L.C. 16,607 (2d Cir. 1965), wherein the employer refused to bargain,
threatened his employees, and encouraged formation of a company union.
Rejecting the employer's contention that a second election should have been
ordered, the court upheld the Board's bargaining order as an appropriate
means of depriving the employer of any benefits of his unfair labor
practices.
25 The Court stated:
"No court . . . has held that a borderline, unaggravated § 8(a) (1) violation, standing alone, occurring prior to an
election, warranted a bargaining order." Supra note 23, at 79. The Court
was careful to note, however, that it was not holding that a bargaining order
could never issue in a section 8(a) (1) case, "but where there is at most
23
24
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The dissenting opinion indicated that it is very difficult to
establish degrees of election interference, and that if reliance is
placed upon mere technicalities, no definite standard can be developed upon which to predicate future results.
Available statistics indicate that of 212 re-run elections held
because of employer misconduct, the objecting union was successful
in only thirty per cent, and that of the total votes cast, the union
picked up only an additional two per cent.28 It would appear from
these statistics that re-run elections are not an adequate remedy
for the aggrieved union. The Board has contended in the past that
regardless of the length of delay before a re-run election, the employer's prior unfair labor practices are never quite forgotten, and
that these practices influence the free choice of employees in any
subsequent election. 27 Considering that the instant case reduces the
availability of the bargaining order to instances of "aggravated"
unfair labor practices by the employer, one can conclude that it
represents a setback for unions in the courts. However, Flomatic
was decided on narrow factual grounds, and will have an effect in
only a small percentage of cases. When the facts are more substantial, and indicate more aggravated types of unfair labor practices by the employer, Board bargaining orders will be issued.
As a result of the instant case the employer and the union are
on more equal bargaining terms. The goal of the NLRA was to
equalize the bargaining position of both contestants, and the instant
case is a refinement in that direction. The bargaining order will
be issued only when the Board is fairly convinced that the employer's practices will be a continued influence in preventing the
union from establishing their representative position in a second
election.
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Plaintiffs had been holders of prop-

erty subject to a possibility of reverter, which ripened in favor of
defendants. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought a declaration that they
owned the property in fee simple absolute and that the defendants,
a moderate unbalancing of an election by an employer such as there was
in this case, there is no adequate justification for putting the union in a

position to unbalance it the other way to an extreme degree." Id. at
80. 2
6 Pollitt, NLRB Re-ran Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209, 212
(1963). For an evaluation of the NLRB remedies generally, see McCulloch,
An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB, 15 LAB. LJ . 755
(1964).
27See Pollitt, supra note 26, at 223; Note, 72 YA
L.E.1243, 1250,
1257 (1963).

